The New Gap in America’s R&D Funding Landscape

 

“The scientific community, including funders across sectors of government, philanthropy, and industry, seem to focus on two versions of success: novelty or scale. They bestow awards and grants on those who show either “revolutionary” new ideas or those who purport to solve a problem for millions that can make someone rich. Anything else falls into this category of incremental and it is dismissed. Somehow harvesting the science we have already invested in to solve individual, local, or regional problems that don’t necessarily lend themselves to market rewards is not incentivized. We owe it to American communities to address longstanding and emerging goals and concerns that may not have clear market drivers and may require diverse approaches, such as challenges of clean water and sanitation; drought, flooding, and wildfires; crumbling infrastructure; preventable chronic diseases; opioid addiction—the list is long. The details of these concerns differ across communities, so solutions need to be localized.”

Reopening The Endless Frontier

 

“The policy innovations that emerged from Bush’s recommendations in 1945 have been very successful in many ways. His prescriptions were ideal for a post-WWII era America, and it is important that sustained funding for foundational science continues. Nevertheless, endlessly perpetuating solutions that were correct at the time does not follow Bush’s true legacy, which was to analyze the current national context, specifically focusing on the U.S. science and technology (S&T) system, create a new institutional landscape that filled gaps in that system, and ultimately provide a global model for others. If Bush were alive today, I believe he would expect the country to analyze this moment, not abide by his advice for the problems of his day. An entirely new contextual assessment is required to develop the framework needed for the social, technological, and security concerns of the 21st century. Following his legacy begins with honestly confronting the contemporary context, as difficult as that may be.”

2023 Annual Report

 

At the core of our work lies a fundamental question: How can we empower bold, original thinkers to contribute to the long-term national security of the United States? This question guides our every action. We believe change comes from interdisciplinary thinking, collaboration, and tireless experimentation. 

From the participants in our experiments, in 2023 and previous years, to every individual daring to challenge the status quo, we have nurtured and continue to nurture innovative ideas and support intellectual growth. Through these efforts, the Foundation remains committed to fostering a culture of curiosity, courage, and openness among a diverse array of people dedicated to shaping the future of the United States. 

U.S. Collapse: A Chain-Writing Experiment

March 2024

It is 2053. The United States is no longer a superpower. What happened?

This is the question the Andrew W. Marshall Foundation posed to the public during the summer and fall of 2023. What might occur between 2024 and 2053 for the United States to experience a “rapid, severe, and significant loss” of power? We characterized this shift as a “collapse” – but left the particulars of its definition up to the public. 

The experiment was divided into three phases, each representing a 10-year increment leading to the future state of 2053, when the United States was no longer a superpower. We called for submissions exploring each 10-year increment, starting with 2024–2033. The winning submission of the first phase became the first link in the chain, the starting prompt for the second phase, 2034–2043. This continued to a third phase, thus creating a three-link chain. 

This paper presents the top submission from each period in “The Chain: U.S. Collapse, 2024–2053.” It then presents the runners-up in “Alternative Links in the Chain.” We encourage you to read this paper front to back—and then read it again as a “choose your own adventure.” What other links, and ultimately, chains, are possible? What would you have explored? 

The Incalculable Element: Ancient Innovations for Modern Security Problems

 

 

Narrated by Patrick Kirchner

Many unanticipated dangers—military, political, technological, foreign, and domestic—shadow the U.S. national security landscape, creating a need for adaptive and inventive leadership. But what exactly does this leadership look like? This paper explores insights from what might seem an unusual source: Thucydides’ discussion of how the Sicilians, inspired by the unconventional guidance of the general Hermocrates, facilitate Sparta’s defeat of Athens in the Peloponnesian War. As Thucydides shows, Hermocrates spurs his listeners to reflect on their limitations and biases at a time when imminent peril would seem to call for nothing but confidence. Yet this reflection, by allowing the Sicilians to reconsider their moral and cultural norms, reform their military structures, and join with unlikely allies to resist Athens’s imperialist threat, fosters an innovative outlook that makes that resistance succeed. This ancient case study remains salient for modern audiences because it exemplifies a nontraditional leadership suited to today’s unforeseen security problems.

America’s Reactive Foreign Policy: How U.S. Organizational Culture and Behavior Advantages China

 

Narrated by Patrick Kirchner

This paper critiques the U.S. foreign policy community’s approach to strategic competition with China and raises a crucial question: Is the U.S. government basing strategic competition with China on U.S. interests, or is it reacting in ways that advance the strategic goals of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)?

This paper argues that, because of its organizational culture, the U.S. foreign policy community approaches strategic competition in ways that disadvantage the United States. Through an analysis of the political, military, economic, and psychological condition of U.S. foreign policy, this paper posits that the United States has formed a reactive strategy toward China that leaves it vulnerable to China’s own competitive strategies. Through exploring historical examples and contemporary issues such as Taiwan and integrated deterrence, an underlying pattern emerges. Because it has ill-defined objectives and definitions of success, brought about largely by organizational factors, the United States is developing a reactionary foreign policy that is susceptible to CCP strategies, interests, and advantages. While this paper does not provide a definitive answer, it diagnoses American susceptibility to Chinese strategic manipulation and highlights the need for the United States to develop a more proactive and well-defined strategy to counter China’s competitive strategies effectively.

Chain-Writing 2023

It is 2053. The United States is no longer a superpower.

HOW DID IT GET HERE?

 

2023-2034

Lance Menthe

The crisis began when a small, white mouse in Dresden failed to die. It took some time for anyone to notice: The median lifespan of a lab mouse is about 20 months, but 30 months is not unheard of, and not dying is not a singular event. It was only when a newly hired graduate student at the Max Planck Institute conducted an inventory of the mice retired from previous experiments that she realized something extraordinary had occurred.

Word spread that researchers investigating a treatment for late-stage Alzheimer’s had mistakenly injected several mice with an improperly formulated drug cocktail. The error had been caught before the paper was submitted and the trial had been rerun with disappointing results. Four years later, however, one of the subjects from the original experiment was still living contentedly in her cage, free of degenerative diseases and any symptoms of advanced age.

Subsequent studies soon confirmed the safety and efficacy of similar drug cocktails as a longevity treatment for humans. Pharmaceutical giants raced to file patents in the Global North; bootleg manufactories began fabricating the drugs on an industrial scale in the Global South. Almost overnight, the gray wave of aging populations that had been lurking on the horizon became an onrushing tsunami.

In Western Europe, decades of declining birthrates had left the social democracies vulnerable to the demographic shift yet had also given them time to prepare. The brief surge in defense spending that followed the Russian invasion of Ukraine was quietly reversed to reallocate resources for medical care. Retirement ages were lifted while the workweek was reduced, spreading the labor supply across extended lifespans. Pundits warned, however, of the coming Verknöcherung, the ossification of the body politic as older generations failed to pass the torch to the next.

In China, this freezing of the power structure took a more immediate form as President Xi was elected to unprecedented fourth and fifth terms by the National Congress in 2027 and 2032. To maintain their increasingly aggressive military stance and keep their economy booming, the Chinese Communist Party fully embraced a series of pro-natalist policies.

Meanwhile, in the United States, the social welfare structure teetered on its foundations. A hard-fought hike in the payroll tax had recently bolstered the Medicare and Social Security trust funds, but now they were once again slated to be insolvent within the decade. As generational warfare loomed, political gridlock and rising interest rates conspired to hollow out the federal budget, with the axe falling hardest on national defense, foreign aid, and research investment programs.

No one knows just how far these new longevity treatments will extend human life. Some say they could add 20 years. Some say they could double human lifespans—or even more. As 2033 draws to a close, a forest of cameras now attend an unassuming cage in a Dresden laboratory, broadcasting for all the world to see. Inside, one small, white mouse is still very much alive.

2034-2043

Patrick Hutson

They called it meth.

It was short for what scientists called the “Methuselah Treatment,” but those who coined the term claimed that, for societies, it was just as addictive and destructive as the original meth.

Like any addict, wealthy societies were spending all their money on the source of their addiction. Budgets for defense, aid, and research were halved and halved again as wealthy states in North America, Europe, and the Asia-Pacific were forced to spend billions to support healthcare for their aging populations. And as populations aged, political support for meth—and all its healthcare costs—grew rapidly. After all, no one wanted to be the politician that makes their elderly voters live for centuries but asks that their children drop dead at 77.

Meth’s universal approval turned these wealthy states into gerontocracies: ruled by the old, and for the old. The average age of a U.S. senator grew from 65 in 2023 to 82 in 2043. Vladimir Putin entered his fourth decade as president while a silver haired Xi Jinping—whose pro-natalist policies never took off—continued to serve three more terms. In Germany, Angela Merkel was elected chancellor again in a stunning political comeback while the British joked that Prince William would have to wait longer than King Charles III did to become king.

It may have been called meth, but another metaphor for the treatment’s effects came from a writer at The Economist in a retrospective twenty years after the treatment’s creation. “Meth turned a small mouse immortal and wealthy societies into rhinos,” they wrote. “Grey, wrinkly, blind, top heavy, and nearly extinct.”

But as wealthy states in the Global North aged and declined, the poorer states in the Global South kept growing. Despite the manufacturing of bootleg meth across the Global South, few in the poorer states of Africa, Asia, and Latin America could actually afford the drugs. By avoiding the “rhinoization” of their societies, these still-young societies were able to attract investment while increasing their spending on defense, aid, and research. After decades of colonialism, neo-colonialism, and neo-neo-colonialism, the Global South was realizing that the balance of power was finally changing in their favor.

In 2041 the Global North was shocked when a coalition led by Ghana and India moved to rewrite the UN charter and oust the five permanent members of the Security Council. Despite the vetoes of all five permanent members, the southern coalition successfully argued that any vetoes could be ignored and overruled by a large enough majority. “International law must flexible—unlike their joints!” laughed a Nigerian diplomat.

But a greater crisis was brewing in the Philippines. Incumbent president Paolo Duterte was looking to prove the power of his young and growing homeland constantly living in the shadow of geezers like China and the United States. “These two has-beens have bickered over island chains for decades,” he proclaimed to the newly reformed UN. “Now we are going to decide who controls the South China Sea once and for all….”

2044-2053

Thomas J. Shattuck

Excerpt from “Reflections 100 Years after the Collapse of American Primacy,” Luna Times, July 4, 2153, Henry Kissinger, Minister for Earth Affairs, Lunar Mega-Colony 1.

“…which brings me to why I left my adopted home of the United States in 2053 for the safety of the first lunar colony. The United States that I had known was collapsing before my eyes. I no longer recognized my home. It became less and less the America I loved all because that damn mouse wouldn’t die!

U.S. officials were caught flat-footed by the shocking and unprecedented reforms in the United Nations in 2041, and while the other ousted P5 members begrudgingly adopted their new reduced role, Washington left the organization and kicked the UN out of New York by 2045. As UN Secretary-General Modi closed the doors of the headquarters for the final time, he quipped, “America just locked itself out of relevance for the final time.”

America grew old and ornery as new superpowers emerged. A true telltale sign of this cultural and geopolitical shift was the opening of new Disney World parks in Lagos, São Paulo, and Mumbai and the shuttering of the Orlando and Anaheim parks. Another mouse, not named Mickey, kept Americans’ attention.

The events that truly ended American primacy began in 2051 when Vietnam and the Philippines moved to right the historic wrongs done by the then-People’s Republic of China in the South China Sea. The global security architecture created by Washington in the aftermath of World War II—underpinned by alliances and strategic partnerships—shattered seemingly in an instant.

The two Southeast Asian states secretly agreed to push Chinese military forces out and share the reclaimed resources. They finally had the strength, and Beijing was as irrelevant as Washington at this point.

How did a small Asian conflict that lasted 13 days, with no U.S. casualties, seal the end of America’s role in the world?

It’s quite simple: We did not show up. When Manila invoked the Mutual Defense Treaty almost exactly 100 years after the treaty was signed, Washington did nothing but shrug. The Philippine invocation, I believe, was intentionally done to expose American weakness and to demonstrate the true rise of the new global order.

The U.S. Navy was a rusted flotilla that could perhaps have mustered a few destroyers if we had the sailors. The carrier fleet was decimated in defense cuts. Our once shining fleet could not leave port.

Our oldest ally toppled American dominance to reclaim a few islands in the South China Sea. For years, I raised the alarm to get American leaders to change course, but our fate as a rhino was sealed. Our military extinct. Our leaders blinded by hubris and cataracts.

We were replaced by younger and more dynamic countries who bided their time and knew exactly how to show the world that America was no longer relevant. America was not conquered or destroyed; it simply became a bystander.

The mouse lives on, but it killed America.”

America’s Reactive Foreign Policy: How U.S. Organizational Culture and Behavior Advantages China

July 2023

The Andrew W. Marshall Foundation

This paper critiques the U.S. foreign policy community’s approach to strategic competition with China and raises a crucial question: Is the U.S. government basing strategic competition with China on U.S. interests, or is it reacting in ways that advance the strategic goals of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)?

This paper argues that, because of its organizational culture, the U.S. foreign policy community approaches strategic competition in ways that disadvantage the United States. Through an analysis of the political, military, economic, and psychological condition of U.S. foreign policy, this paper posits that the United States has formed a reactive strategy toward China that leaves it vulnerable to China’s own competitive strategies. Through exploring historical examples and contemporary issues such as Taiwan and integrated deterrence, an underlying pattern emerges. Because it has ill-defined objectives and definitions of success, brought about largely by organizational factors, the United States is developing a reactionary foreign policy that is susceptible to CCP strategies, interests, and advantages. While this paper does not provide a definitive answer, it diagnoses American susceptibility to Chinese strategic manipulation and highlights the need for the United States to develop a more proactive and well-defined strategy to counter China’s competitive strategies effectively.

CCP Weapons of Mass Persuasion

 

Narrated by Patrick Kirchner

This paper is part of the Andrew W. Marshall Foundation’s set of publications on Examining History to Explore the Future: France, the United States, and China. This project was made possible by a generous grant from the Richard Lounsbery Foundation.

The Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP’s) approach to the United States today reflects the party’s formative competitive experiences a century ago. Starting in the 1920s, the CCP vied with the Nationalist Party (KMT) for control over China, but the CCP was also nominally allied with the KMT in the First United Front, 1924–27. In that context, the Communists waged political warfare against the KMT at the elite and the grassroots level. Initially, the CCP’s aim was to coopt the KMT. When cooption failed, the Communists turned to subversion before attacking the Nationalists kinetically. In recent decades, the CCP has used this united-front template against the United States, thanks partly to a foundation of U.S.-CCP cooperation laid during the Sino-Japanese War and reinforced in the late Cold War. This report accordingly traces the CCP’s repertoire for strategic competition to the Chinese Civil War (Part 1). It then analyzes the application of this toolkit to the United States across a series of interactions beginning in the late 1930s and continuing through the present (Part 2). The report concludes with two alternative visions of how the coming decades could unfold, hinging upon Washington’s ability to counter Beijing’s ongoing subversion campaign (Part 3).

 

2022 Annual Report

 

In 2022, we continued the work we began in 2021, our first operating year, by experimenting with ways to find and foster intellectually curious people who are passionate about the future of the United States.

Our work in 2022 reinforces our belief that it is crucial to find the best people to address the long-term problems that could impact our national interests. This is what Andy Marshall did during his life, and it is one of his many legacies that we will continue to uphold.

Reflections on Net Assessment

October 4, 2022

The Andrew W. Marshall Foundation & Institute for Defense Analyses


Andrew W. Marshall, Edited by Jeffrey S. McKitrick and Robert G. Angevine

Watch the Launch Event


Published by the Andrew W. Marshall Foundation (AWMF) and the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA), Reflections on Net Assessment features newly released interviews with Andy Marshall, one of the longest-serving defense intellectuals in the United States, including 25 years at the RAND Corporation and more than 40 years as the founding director of Net Assessment in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.


Backed by their decades of experience working inside or supporting the Office of Net Assessment at the U.S. Department of Defense, editors Jeffrey S. McKitrick and Robert G. Angevine have woven together a description of Marshall’s place in the rapidly changing 20th century with interviews that defense analyst Kurt Guthe conducted with Marshall between 1993 and 1999. In these interviews, Marshall reflects on the themes that defined his career. He recounts his experience as an analyst among exceptional thinkers at the flourishing RAND Corporation during the Cold War and his work in national security and defense under six U.S. presidents. Readers gain insight into his basic beliefs about human endeavors, his view on the nature of competition between nations, and his strategy for exerting influence in the U.S. government.

Reflections on Net Assessment is an opportunity to learn about the intellectual history of net assessment in Andy Marshall’s own words. It is a unique primary source for students, experts, and anyone interested in national security and strategy.


The original interviews with Andrew Marshall upon which this book is based were funded by the Smith Richardson Foundation.

“The Incalculable Element”: Ancient Innovations for Modern Security Problems

May 2023

The Andrew W. Marshall Foundation

Many unanticipated dangers—military, political, technological, foreign, and domestic—shadow the U.S. national security landscape, creating a need for adaptive and inventive leadership. But what exactly does this leadership look like? This paper explores insights from what might seem an unusual source: Thucydides’ discussion of how the Sicilians, inspired by the unconventional guidance of the general Hermocrates, facilitate Sparta’s defeat of Athens in the Peloponnesian War. As Thucydides shows, Hermocrates spurs his listeners to reflect on their limitations and biases at a time when imminent peril would seem to call for nothing but confidence. Yet this reflection, by allowing the Sicilians to reconsider their moral and cultural norms, reform their military structures, and join with unlikely allies to resist Athens’s imperialist threat, fosters an innovative outlook that makes that resistance succeed. This ancient case study remains salient for modern audiences because it exemplifies a nontraditional leadership suited to today’s unforeseen security problems.

 

Praise for “The Incalculable Element”

“In a word, this is wonderful. It is an apt, appropriate use of applied history. In a tumultuous time when journalists seem to be the only voices trying to make sense of our situation, nearly all historians have been unable to give us guideposts or a compass to orient us to solutions. As W. Churchill put it, the more one can look into the past, the further one can look into the future….This paper rates study and application to our own thinking about what we face. Vice dismissing the reasons for the internal disarray, Hermocrates sought to understand them and then to show them why they must mature their thinking. Where in America is such informed leadership today?

This is an award-winning paper in the truest sense of the word. This demonstrates why we need historians who can apply history to our current situation. As SecDef I often got my best new ideas from old books/history.

This paper is nothing short of exciting in what it unlocks….I’m inspired and humbled by [Emily’s] application of history. Hermocrates ranks with Aurelian guiding Rome out of the crisis of the third century AD or Choiseul’s thoughtful leadership under the Sun King.”

James N. Mattis, 26th United States Secretary of Defense