“Technology makes a revolution possible, but the revolution itself takes place only when new concepts of operation develop and new military organizations emerge in order to take full advantage of the opportunities generated by the relevant technologies.”
Remarks of Andrew W. Marshall, Director of OSD Net Assessment, delivered at the National Security Industrial Association’s 13 September 1995 Seminar on “Submarines in the Littoral.”
“In this third essay of my series, “When Efficiency Harms the Mission,” I delve into the hidden costs of prioritizing efficiency above all else. While efficiency often provides tidy, short-term gains, it can undermine the resilience and adaptability needed to respond successfully in when our strengths are rendered less effective.
The essay challenges us to rethink our obsession with centralized control and quantifiable outcomes, proposing a shift toward a decentralized, competitive approach that embraces longstanding American strengths of diversity, tension, and creativity. Drawing from lessons in war, innovation, and policy, I argue that focusing on mission over function is key to true national security.
This series continues to discuss the idea that we are in a moment of transition and our current emerging problems resist our old solutions. It’s critical that we spend some time reflecting on what frameworks we need to foster resilience in an uncertain world rather that jumping straight to solutions.”
“The scientific community, including funders across sectors of government, philanthropy, and industry, seem to focus on two versions of success: novelty or scale. They bestow awards and grants on those who show either “revolutionary” new ideas or those who purport to solve a problem for millions that can make someone rich. Anything else falls into this category of incremental and it is dismissed. Somehow harvesting the science we have already invested in to solve individual, local, or regional problems that don’t necessarily lend themselves to market rewards is not incentivized. We owe it to American communities to address longstanding and emerging goals and concerns that may not have clear market drivers and may require diverse approaches, such as challenges of clean water and sanitation; drought, flooding, and wildfires; crumbling infrastructure; preventable chronic diseases; opioid addiction—the list is long. The details of these concerns differ across communities, so solutions need to be localized….”
“The policy innovations that emerged from Bush’s recommendations in 1945 have been very successful in many ways. His prescriptions were ideal for a post-WWII era America, and it is important that sustained funding for foundational science continues. Nevertheless, endlessly perpetuating solutions that were correct at the time does not follow Bush’s true legacy, which was to analyze the current national context, specifically focusing on the U.S. science and technology (S&T) system, create a new institutional landscape that filled gaps in that system, and ultimately provide a global model for others. If Bush were alive today, I believe he would expect the country to analyze this moment, not abide by his advice for the problems of his day. An entirely new contextual assessment is required to develop the framework needed for the social, technological, and security concerns of the 21st century. Following his legacy begins with honestly confronting the contemporary context, as difficult as that may be.”
At the core of our work lies a fundamental question: How can we empower bold, original thinkers to contribute to the long-term national security of the United States? This question guides our every action. We believe change comes from interdisciplinary thinking, collaboration, and tireless experimentation.
From the participants in our experiments, in 2023 and previous years, to every individual daring to challenge the status quo, we have nurtured and continue to nurture innovative ideas and support intellectual growth. Through these efforts, the Foundation remains committed to fostering a culture of curiosity, courage, and openness among a diverse array of people dedicated to shaping the future of the United States.
March 2024
This is the question the Andrew W. Marshall Foundation posed to the public during the summer and fall of 2023. What might occur between 2024 and 2053 for the United States to experience a “rapid, severe, and significant loss” of power? We characterized this shift as a “collapse” – but left the particulars of its definition up to the public.
The experiment was divided into three phases, each representing a 10-year increment leading to the future state of 2053, when the United States was no longer a superpower. We called for submissions exploring each 10-year increment, starting with 2024–2033. The winning submission of the first phase became the first link in the chain, the starting prompt for the second phase, 2034–2043. This continued to a third phase, thus creating a three-link chain.
This paper presents the top submission from each period in “The Chain: U.S. Collapse, 2024–2053.” It then presents the runners-up in “Alternative Links in the Chain.” We encourage you to read this paper front to back—and then read it again as a “choose your own adventure.” What other links, and ultimately, chains, are possible? What would you have explored?
Narrated by Patrick Kirchner
Many unanticipated dangers—military, political, technological, foreign, and domestic—shadow the U.S. national security landscape, creating a need for adaptive and inventive leadership. But what exactly does this leadership look like? This paper explores insights from what might seem an unusual source: Thucydides’ discussion of how the Sicilians, inspired by the unconventional guidance of the general Hermocrates, facilitate Sparta’s defeat of Athens in the Peloponnesian War. As Thucydides shows, Hermocrates spurs his listeners to reflect on their limitations and biases at a time when imminent peril would seem to call for nothing but confidence. Yet this reflection, by allowing the Sicilians to reconsider their moral and cultural norms, reform their military structures, and join with unlikely allies to resist Athens’s imperialist threat, fosters an innovative outlook that makes that resistance succeed. This ancient case study remains salient for modern audiences because it exemplifies a nontraditional leadership suited to today’s unforeseen security problems.
Narrated by Patrick Kirchner
This paper critiques the U.S. foreign policy community’s approach to strategic competition with China and raises a crucial question: Is the U.S. government basing strategic competition with China on U.S. interests, or is it reacting in ways that advance the strategic goals of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)?
This paper argues that, because of its organizational culture, the U.S. foreign policy community approaches strategic competition in ways that disadvantage the United States. Through an analysis of the political, military, economic, and psychological condition of U.S. foreign policy, this paper posits that the United States has formed a reactive strategy toward China that leaves it vulnerable to China’s own competitive strategies. Through exploring historical examples and contemporary issues such as Taiwan and integrated deterrence, an underlying pattern emerges. Because it has ill-defined objectives and definitions of success, brought about largely by organizational factors, the United States is developing a reactionary foreign policy that is susceptible to CCP strategies, interests, and advantages. While this paper does not provide a definitive answer, it diagnoses American susceptibility to Chinese strategic manipulation and highlights the need for the United States to develop a more proactive and well-defined strategy to counter China’s competitive strategies effectively.
