Long-Term Competition with the Soviets: A Framework for Strategic Analysis

1972

RAND Corporation

“A suggestion for a shift in focus on planning and programming U.S. strategic forces. Long-term analysis of the U.S.-Soviet competition should be concerned with both opponents, treating threats within that framework, searching for areas of possible U.S. advantage, and looking for weaknesses as well as strengths. Current analysis focuses solely on warding off potential Soviet difficulties and advantages. It is doubtful that forces on either side develop in accordance with simply stated national goals. Analysis should incorporate the tools of Bayesian analysis and two-sided, force-posture planning games, similar to SAFE and XRAY. It should develop more comprehensive U.S. positions on composition of strategic forces, SALT, arms-control issues, the nature of the strategic arms competition, and general U.S. objectives. By leading away from concentration on a single criterion, the analysis could gain some freedom in planning.”

Problems of Estimating Military Power

1966

RAND Corporation

“Mere tabulations of military forces are not meaningful estimates of military power, which is always relative to the military posture of some other country or alliance. Until we understand the decisionmaking process within typical military bureaucracies and take account of the political balancing, coordination problems, information flow, conflicting objectives, etc., we cannot effectively forecast future military postures beyond the four to five years decisively determined by present military commitments and inertia. Models of the decisionmaking behavior of a military organization should treat it as an adaptively rational multi-objective process, rather than an omnisciently rational single-objective process like that shown in the SAFE force planning game. This paper was prepared for presentation to the American Political Science Meetings in New York, September 6-10, 1966. 22 pp.”

Determinants of NATO Force Posture

1966

RAND Corporation

“A discussion of the political and economic factors that continue to keep Western Europe militarily weak despite the spending of almost twenty billion a year on defense. The author sees the major determining factors in the diversion of resources to national rather than alliance use, in diseconomies of scale, in the high production cost of weapons, and in underinvestment in new equipment.”

Cost/Benefit Analysis in Health

1965

RAND Corporation

“Discussion of the economics of medical care and medical research. The author reviews the relevant research on the problem of cost benefit analyses in health (the focus is on the work of economists interested in the economic implications of improved health), and explores the likely requirements, difficulties, and opportunities for cost-effectiveness studies in government health programs. A sample program budget for health prepared by the Bureau of the Budget is included.”

The Deterrence and Strategy of Total War, 1959-1961: A Method of Analysis

1959

RAND Corporation

“This study was primarily undertaken in order to develop additional methods for the analysis of deterrence and wartime strategy. The substantive conclusions are largely a by-product of the attempt to illustrate how the method of analysis operates. These substantive results are based on certain hypothetical numbers introduced to make clearer and more concrete the nature of the model employed.”

Predictability of the Costs, Time, and Success of Development

1959

RAND Corporation

“Results of some recent research into the extent and nature of the uncertainty in new developments, with emphasis on problems of development in the Air Force. “Early” estimates of important parameters are usually quite inaccurate because they are “biased” toward overoptimism and because the errors in estimates evidence a substantial variation. The accuracy of estimates is found to be a function of the stage of development, i.e., estimates improve as development of the item progresses.”

Experimentation by Simulation and Monte Carlo

1958

RAND Corporation

“A discussion of simulation and Monte Carlo as modes of analysis of particular interest in problems of operations analysis involving many variables. After defining these terms, the author considers (1) Monte Carlo design when simulation aspects are not emphasized, and (2) simulation design with Monte Carlo aspects.”

The Small Sample Distribution

1957

RAND Corporation

“A discussion of asymptotic distribution. (Published in The Annals of Mathematical Statistics, Mar. 1958.)”

A Note on Randomized Branch Sampling

1955

RAND Corporation

“A discussion of the operation of randomized branch sampling, the relation between this sampling plan and importance sampling developed in Monte Carlo calculations, and some improvements to Jessen’s theory based on the identity of these methods.”

An Application of Markov Processes to the Study of the Epidemiology of Mental Disease

1954

RAND Corporation

“A presentation of several methods (developed in studies of mental disease) for determining certain epidemiological parameters that are not directly observable or that can be secured only by expensive and time-consuming field surveys. The simple models of the process involved in the passage from sanity to insanity, hospitalization and death provide some picture of the underlying process that generates a given incidence rate.”

The Use of Multistage Sampling Schemes in Monte Carlo Computations

1954

RAND Corporation

“A review of importance sampling, a technique whereby Monte Carlo computations are made more efficient — provided the probability distribution, from which the sample observations are drawn, is judiciously chosen. (Published in H. A. Meyer (ed.), Symposium on Monte Carlo Methods, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., New York, 1956.)”