January 2, 2015
CNBC
“Since Andrew Marshall founded the Pentagon’s Office of Net Assessment in the early ’70s, he’s been the only person to head the think tank. But at the age of 93, Marshall—nicknamed “Yoda” after the sage extraterrestrial character from “Star Wars”—is retiring, according to the Washington Post.”
December 4, 2013
The Washington Post
“Yoda is the nom de guerre for Andrew W. Marshall, the 92-year-old futurist who directs the Pentagon’s obliquely named internal think tank, the Office of Net Assessment. A fixture in national-security circles since the dawn of the Cold War, Marshall contemplates military strategy and apocalyptic scenarios that could emerge in the decades to come.”
November 1, 2013
Foreign Policy
“The current situation is such that the U.S. cannot afford to continue devoting resources to defense without a well-thought-out strategy for competing…We can no longer indulge in the ‘rich man’ strategy of insuring against all possible adverse futures…We can no longer afford to compete by simply doing more of the same.”
October 27, 2013
The Washington Post
“From his office deep inside the Pentagon, Yoda has outlasted the Cold War, countless military conflicts and 10 presidential elections. But can he survive the sequester? Yoda is the reverential nickname for Andrew W. Marshall, a legendary if mysterious figure in national security circles. A bald, enigmatic 92-year-old strategic guru, he resembles the Jedi master of “Star Wars” fame in more ways than one.”
February 1, 2003
Wired Magazine
“For 40 years, the man Pentagon insiders call Yoda has foreseen the future of war – from battlefield bots rolling off radar-proof ships to GIs popping performance pills. And that was before the war on terror.”
September 1985
Harvard Business Review
“It is fashionable to downplay and even denigrate the usefulness of economic forecasting. The reason is obvious: forecasters seem to be more often wrong than right. Yet most U.S. companies continue to use a variety of forecasting techniques because no one has apparently developed a better way to deal with the future’s economic uncertainty.
Still, there are exceptions, like Royal Dutch/Shell. Beginning in the late 1960s and early 1970s, Shell developed a technique known as “scenario planning.” By listening to planners’ analysis of the global business environment, Shell’s management was prepared for the eventuality—if not the timing—of the 1973 oil crisis. And again in 1981, when other oil companies stockpiled reserves in the aftermath of the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war, Shell sold off its excess before the glut became a reality and prices collapsed.
Undoubtedly, many readers believe they are familiar with scenarios. But the decision scenarios developed by Shell in Europe are a far cry from their usual U.S. counterparts. In this article and a sequel to come, the author describes their evolution and ultimate impact on Shell’s management.”
Autumn 1975
Foreign Policy
No. 20, pp. 170-198
“We have all been waiting for the Great Debate on strategic arms so widely heralded a year ago. But it is hard to conduct any debate, much less a great debate, when language is used with almost no relation to the world it is supposed to describe. Contrast what has been happening to strategic forces and what we say has been happening.”
