1966
RAND Corporation
“Mere tabulations of military forces are not meaningful estimates of military power, which is always relative to the military posture of some other country or alliance. Until we understand the decisionmaking process within typical military bureaucracies and take account of the political balancing, coordination problems, information flow, conflicting objectives, etc., we cannot effectively forecast future military postures beyond the four to five years decisively determined by present military commitments and inertia. Models of the decisionmaking behavior of a military organization should treat it as an adaptively rational multi-objective process, rather than an omnisciently rational single-objective process like that shown in the SAFE force planning game. This paper was prepared for presentation to the American Political Science Meetings in New York, September 6-10, 1966. 22 pp.”
1966
RAND Corporation
“A discussion of the political and economic factors that continue to keep Western Europe militarily weak despite the spending of almost twenty billion a year on defense. The author sees the major determining factors in the diversion of resources to national rather than alliance use, in diseconomies of scale, in the high production cost of weapons, and in underinvestment in new equipment.”
1965
RAND Corporation
“Discussion of the economics of medical care and medical research. The author reviews the relevant research on the problem of cost benefit analyses in health (the focus is on the work of economists interested in the economic implications of improved health), and explores the likely requirements, difficulties, and opportunities for cost-effectiveness studies in government health programs. A sample program budget for health prepared by the Bureau of the Budget is included.”
1959
RAND Corporation
“This study was primarily undertaken in order to develop additional methods for the analysis of deterrence and wartime strategy. The substantive conclusions are largely a by-product of the attempt to illustrate how the method of analysis operates. These substantive results are based on certain hypothetical numbers introduced to make clearer and more concrete the nature of the model employed.”
1959
RAND Corporation
“Results of some recent research into the extent and nature of the uncertainty in new developments, with emphasis on problems of development in the Air Force. “Early” estimates of important parameters are usually quite inaccurate because they are “biased” toward overoptimism and because the errors in estimates evidence a substantial variation. The accuracy of estimates is found to be a function of the stage of development, i.e., estimates improve as development of the item progresses.”
1958
RAND Corporation
“A discussion of simulation and Monte Carlo as modes of analysis of particular interest in problems of operations analysis involving many variables. After defining these terms, the author considers (1) Monte Carlo design when simulation aspects are not emphasized, and (2) simulation design with Monte Carlo aspects.”
1957
RAND Corporation
“A discussion of asymptotic distribution. (Published in The Annals of Mathematical Statistics, Mar. 1958.)”
1955
RAND Corporation
“A discussion of (1) the progress of Monte Carlo techniques from 1949 to the present and (2) the papers presented before the Symposium on Monte Carlo Methods at Gainesvill, Florida, March 16-17, 1954. Monte Carlo is defined as a random sampling procedure for treating mathematical problems of either deterministic or probabilistic type.”