Author: Andrew May

Reconfigurations and Revolutions

September 29, 2022

The Andrew W. Marshall Foundation

 

Presentations of the Inaugural Andrew W. Marshall Paper Prizes

on Future Reconfigurations in Asia 2045 and New Revolutions in Military Affairs

Reconfigurations: How might technology companies change the way nation states interact with each other and achieve their strategic objectives? How might they impact the configuration of the balance of power in Asia?

Revolutions: What are the prospects for artificial intelligence (AI) initiating a new revolution in military affairs? What are the potential frameworks for understanding a future AI RMA?

This two-part webinar will feature a discussion with Treston Wheat, winner of the paper prize on Future Reconfigurations in Asia 2045, and a discussion with Owen J. Daniels, winner of the paper prize on New Revolutions in Military Affairs. A Q&A session will follow.

Submit questions during the event to info@andrewwmarshallfoundation.org.

This virtual event is on the record and open to the media.

Agenda

Welcome
Jaymie Durnan, AWMF Co-founder and Chairman

“A State in Disguise of a Merchant”: Balance of Power and Multinational Corporations in the Reconfiguration of Asia
Treston Wheat, Andrew May

The “AI RMA”: The Revolution Has Not Arrived (Yet)
Owen J. Daniels, Bob Angevine

Question & Answer Session
Treston Wheat, Owen J. Daniels

Closing Remarks
Jaymie Durnan

Celebrating 100 Years: Andy Marshall’s Life and Legacy

September 13, 2021

The Andrew W. Marshall Foundation

 

On Monday, September 13, 2021, the Andrew W. Marshall Foundation (AWMF) hosted an event in honor of Andy Marshall’s centenary.

Jaymie Durnan, Co-Founder and Chairman of AWMF, welcomed the audience. Mr. Durnan noted that “Andy was much more than his career; he was a friend, a man who loved his two wives, both of whom predeceased him, and a man who knew when to be serious, when to tell jokes, and when just to have fun.”

Dr. Richard Danzig, 71st Secretary of the Navy, provided opening remarks. He referred to Andy as a “remarkably smart man with rock-hard integrity,” and focused his remarks on Andy’s relations with those with whom he worked. “Andy loved us and we loved him,” said Dr. Danzig. “Andy had this extraordinary quality; he gave each of us a sense that we were important, that he cared about what we thought.”

Dr. Jacqueline Deal, President of Long-Term Strategy Group (LTSG), moderated the event and provided remarks on understanding Andy’s past and legacy: “Mr. Marshall was unusual not just because of his longevity, but also because of his curiosity, the knowledge he acquired through practical work, and the perspective that this gave him.”

Dr. Andrew May spoke about Andy’s influences and approach. “Andy was an analyst who pioneered wholly new methods of studying the behavior of ourselves and our adversaries,” Dr. May said. “He encouraged us to think more deeply and more thoroughly, and more originally and more grounded in reality than we otherwise would ever have done.”

Dr. Matthew Daniels discussed how we may channel Andy’s ways for the challenges ahead. Andy “succeeded in building a network of some of the very best thinkers in the United States,” Dr. Daniels said. He continued to recommend that we “encourage somewhat unusual people to be…independent thinkers,” and concluded: “the good life can center on exercising curiosity and solving hard problems, and doing good for our people and our society.”

The event concluded with a question-and-answer session with the audience.

For more reflections on Andy Marshall’s life and legacy, see Remembering Andy Marshall: Essays by His Friends.

Remembering Andy Marshall

May 2020

The Andrew W. Marshall Foundation

This publication features reflections, remarks, and essays by:

Graham Allison

Mie Augier

Jesse Ausubel

Gordon Barrass

Rebecca Bash

Keith Bickel

Jacqueline Deal

Nicholas Eberstadt

David Epstein

David Fahrenkrug

Aaron Friedberg

Melissa Hathaway

Andrew Krepinevich

Scooter Libby

Andrew May

Jeffrey S. McKitrick

John Milam

Chip Pickett

Dmitry Ponomareff

Jim Powell

James Roche

Stephen P. Rosen

Paul Selva

Abram Shulsky

Anna Simons

Lionel Tiger

Barry Watts

The RAND Corporation and the Dynamics of American Strategic Thought, 1946 – 1962

1998

Emory University

“From the time of its inception in 1946, the RAND Corporation has stood at or near the center of strategic thought in America. Over the course of nearly 20 years, the dynamics of strategic thought at RAND shifted dramatically. The strategists’ focus shifted from the development of strategies for ‘efficient’ war in the late 1940s, to an exclusive focus on deterrence in the mid-1950s, to a much broader, strategic-political appreciation for nuclear weapons in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Over the course of these shifts, the analysts at RAND developed a few central tenets of nuclear strategy: the best way to survive war was to avoid it altogether; the nation’s forces could not deter an attack they could not survive; in the event deterrence failed, the nation should attempt to control the use of nuclear weapons and limit, insofar as possible, civilian casualties in both the U.S. and the USSR; flexibility in the nation’s nuclear strategy could translate into a more flexible and aggressive national strategy. Out of these manifold tenets was born counterforce, a strategy for both deterrence and war that called for invulnerable forces, city-avoidance, counter-military strikes, and the preservation of command-and-control systems on both sides. Counterforce, it was hoped, would allow the U.S. to use its nuclear weapons in a controlled and discriminate way, avoiding the needless slaughter of civilians while simultaneously limiting the effectiveness of the Soviet offensive and ultimately bringing war to a negotiated end.

With the election of John F. Kennedy in 1960, RAND moved to the upper levels of defense policy-making. In less than two years, Kennedy’s Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, instituted many of the changes called for by the RAND strategists, creating a national strategic force that was both well-protected and capable, in the event deterrence failed, of waging war in a controlled and discriminate fashion. Although McNamara soon publicly disavowed counterforce, in fact it remained as the foundation of American nuclear strategy for decades to come.”